

Efficient Implementation of Digital Standard Cells-Based True Random Number Generator for Securing FPGA Designs

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Abstract

Random numbers are fundamental resources in the field of computing and engineering. They have a wide scope of application including cryptography and simulation. True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) are considered to be the most secure based on the quality of its entropy sources. With the availability of several sources of entropy, ring oscillator architecture can easily be used as a quality source of entropy for a TRNG due to the inherent jitters and the simplicity of its design. Since there is still a possibility of a generator to generate random numbers that do not meet the required security metrics, hence, it is imperative for a TRNG to be able to quickly regenerate another set of random bit sequence. For these reasons, this research, proposes a high-speed array-sampling and a post-processing unit ring oscillator-based TRNG with improved statistical measures and throughput for securing FPGA devices. The core architecture consists of digital primitive cells - the ring oscillator, Q-Flip Flop, and the CubeHash algorithm. These are used as the building blocks for constructing the proposed TRNG architecture. This proposed hardware architecture reveals an improvement in throughput and the statistical measure of the quality of generated bits. The architecture was modeled and simulated using Verilog HDL, Modelsim SE, and Xilinx's ISim simulation tools. This architecture was designed using both the Xilinx ISE and Vivado tools. The proposed design was implemented on the Spartan 6 and Cyclone IV FPGA devices and occupies an area of 3287 LUTs and 1714 Slice registers and had a maximum throughput of 1422 Mbps. Sampled bitstreams' statistical accuracies were ascertained using NIST's statistical Test package program.

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1. Introduction

Internet-of-things (IoT), has gradually developed into what is arguably the largest technological platform having huge potential benefits. It has woven itself into the very fiber of our everyday life. This is the case owed to the varied computational capabilities and sizes they exhibit. They span a range of passively powered wearable health-care monitoring devices to powerful edge devices or nodes. These devices or sensors can be located in homes, cars, farms, factories, laboratories, and hospitals to increase productivity and results. These potential benefits they offer have shown that an estimated 50 billion connected devices are expected by the year 2020 [1] These devices such as the ones used in the hospital to monitor a patient's vital organs, usually possess and process a large amount of data that is highly sensitive and confidential. These make the IoT platforms a

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Figure 1. Taxonomy of Random Number Generator

breeding ground for adversaries and attackers to ply their trade. The information-rich data they possessed by these IoT nodes and sensor have necessitated that the security and privacy of these platforms must be treated with a great deal of attention to mitigate majority, if not all, of the current and emerging security attacks such as the IoT based distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks [2].

A means by which the security and privacy of the IoT platform can be preserved is through cryptography. where messages or information is encoded (locked) with a key (ephemeral keys, session keys, signatures) and is only decoded (unlocked) by the intended recipient who has access to this key. These keys can be generated by running a Random Number Generator (RNG). From Fig. 1, there are at least two main types of the RNG: Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) and the True Random Number Generator (TRNG). PRNG, also known as Deterministic Random Number Generator (DRNG) rely on complex algorithms or mathematical procedures alongside a seed (an initial value) to generate random bit sequences. These bit sequences of the PRNG are completely deterministic and hence

when one uses a "weak" seed for generation, then the amount of time taken for a bit sequence to be regenerated is shorter and undesirable. On the other hand, TRNG uses purely random and nondeterministic electronic effects as the source of its randomness as compared to the algorithmic-based PRNG. The sources of randomness (entropy) for the Physical-TRNG (PTRNG) include thermal noise from semiconductors, metastability (Quantum mechanics), Timing Jitters, and Chaos circuits whereas that for the Non-Physical-TRNG (NPTRNG) can include system time, RAM contents, keyboard loggers, etc. This implies that the NPTRNGs are software-based whereas the PTRNGs are hardware-based.

A ring oscillator (RO) is a chain connection of an odd number of inverter gates in series and having their final output fed back into the input of the first inverter gate [3]. This setup causes the output of the inverter ring to oscillate between the two voltage levels of high and low [4]. These ring oscillators are extensively used in hardware and electronics design because of the simplicity of their structure, ease of design and the low cost of implementation associated with it. They are desired because they present a simpler and



effective method of building TRNGs [5-8]. The entropy of any state or message as represented in Equation (1), measures the average amount of information needed to represent an even taken from a probability distribution for a random variable.[9]. From Equation (1), p., represents the *rth* state or message out of a total of *t* possible states or messages. The optional value K can be evaluated to the value $\frac{1}{\log(2)}$. A random number generator that generates K-bits of binary sequences has the probability that, an output will equal r to be p_r , As required by every RNG, the source of entropy in the case of a ring oscillator is the presence of jitters [10]. According to [11], Due to the many storage elements arising from the multiple stages of inverters in a ring oscillator coupled with the delay component of each stage, which depends on the capacitance (stray and junction) and carrier transit times, absolute frequency stability is therefore not guaranteed.

$$H = -K \sum_{r=i}^{t} p_r log p_r \tag{1}$$

The applicability of random numbers ranges from the field of arts to cryptography and these random generators (RNGs) critical numbers are components of a cryptographic ecosystem. Great cryptography requires quality random numbers. The random number generator for any cryptographic application should seem to adversaries as close to perfect RNG. It is therefore crucial for a cryptographic application to generate PRBS which cannot be predicted even by the toughest adversaries. Generally, such quality true random number generators have a generic architecture as shown in Fig. 2. The component blocks of the generic architecture include the entropy source, the harvesting technique, the postprocessing block, the total failure test, and the online tests. The source of entropy is the critical component of the architecture because this is

where the "the randomness" is generated. As mentioned earlier, several sources of entropy exist which determines the class of random number being generated. The time-continuous signals obtained from the entropy sources are harvested (digitized) for form what is termed digitized analog signals. Since some of these entropy sources have some form of bias, the postprocessing stage is implemented to reduce or eventually eliminate some of these weaknesses that may be present.

This paper, therefore, presents an efficient TRNG architecture based on the generic TRNG architecture, by using a vector array-sampling approach to accumulate and harvest the jitters that are inherent in the ring oscillator and then finally using the CubeHash hashing algorithm for postprocessing. This approach promises results that pass the statistical test as well as having great throughput. The remaining portions of this article are organized as follows: From Section 2, a brief review of some related works. The TRNG hardware architecture is discussed in the 3rd Section. In Section 4, the proposed architecture's statistical quality matrices, as well as result analysis, covered. Recommendations are regarding the trade-off between hardware area and throughput are discussed briefly in Section 5. Finally, conclusion and future work are discussed in Section 6 of the paper.

2. Related Work

Numerous random number generators have been designed and proposed based on either pure digital electronics or a mixture of digital and analog electronics. A typical example is that proposed by [12]. This design relied on a blend of both the analog and digital electronics components to amplify and sample white noise. The main drawback of this design was related to the stage of amplification. This stage consumed more power to be able to raise the level of noise a few orders of





Figure 2. TRNG Generic Architecture

magnitude in order to allow digitization. The Intel random number generator [13] shown in Fig. 3 implemented a similar concept whereby the Johnson noise (thermal noise) from resistors is amplified in order to drive a voltage-controlled oscillator that is in turn sampled by a high-speed oscillator and then post-processed digitally with the von Neumann algorithm. A purely digital electronics-based architecture was proposed by [14]. In this architecture, the outputs of Linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) and cellular automata are randomly sampled to obtain and measure the randomness that is associated with the jitters in the ring oscillators. For this architecture, due to the complexity of the harvesting scheme implemented, the harvested samples were difficult to verify although this proposed architecture had no amplification stage or step and the source of entropy was obviously limited to the two ring oscillators implemented. Not all, a simple architecture was proposed by [15] which was based on metastability of circuits but had the disadvantage of combining a large number of such circuit in order to pass statistical tests. Also, two novel hardware random number generator architectures were presented by [16] that also relied on the metastability of latches. The first of these was the RNG with the capability of nullifying direct current (DC) for the operations that require extremely low power consumption. In addition to the DC-nulling RNG, a finite impulse

response (FIR)-based RNG that implements the predictive whitening filter to be able to separate non-random components from the generated bits sequences was proposed. The RO-based TRNG was proposed by [6]. This architecture relied on a design that was similar in several ways to the Linear Feedback Shift Generator (LFSR) in which the registers are replaced with inverters. The positions of the feedbacks are labeled with switch values making them open if 0 or low and closed if 1 or high. The authors also proposed the use of self-controlled LFSR as the post-processing unit.

3. Proposed Architecture

As depicted in Fig. 2, the proposed TRNG comprise of the three key components that are required for a TRNG. Because this is a purely digital TRNG, we do not use amplifiers to enable the harvesting or sampling of the randomness. The various components are presented in detail in the sub-sections that follow. Fig. 4 shows the block diagram of the proposed TRNG. The block diagram consists of 4 multi-mode ring oscillator architectures as the main source of entropy. These individual ring oscillators are XORed to form a single source of entropy signal which is sampled by an array of sampling units. The resulting bitstreams from the multisampling are then passed through a cryptographic hash algorithm for postprocessing to increase the rate as well as the quality of bits generated.





Figure 3. The Architecture of Intel's Random Number Generator



Figure 4. Proposed TRNG Architecture

3.1. Multi-Edge Ring Oscillator

The source of entropy for the proposed architecture is the Ring Oscillator (RO). The ring oscillator is employed due to the inherent jitters that are present and accumulate as a result of their operation. Conventional ring oscillators have a single NAND gate and an even number of inverter gates that pulses a single edge signal to propagate through the ring oscillator. However, the architecture proposed by [17] showed a 3-input node ring oscillator that pulses three different edges for a single ring oscillator simultaneously with each edge propagating through the chain as in a conventional ring oscillator architecture. The three edges are 120 degrees phase-shifted and

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boost the resulting frequency by a factor of three (3). The accumulated jitters cause the pulse width between two neighboring edges to increase in variation with each completed cycle. With time the two neighboring edges will merge into a single edge, taking the multi-edge ring oscillator into a single edge ring oscillator. The time taken to collapse is the time taken to accumulate the jitters that are sampled to generate random numbers. The entropy source implemented includes 4 sets of ring oscillator chains in the multimode and having different stages for each ring oscillator chain. The NAND gate replaces an inverter to allow for easy control of the ring oscillator. When a value high is present at the enable input, 3 pulse edges are



propagated simultaneously through the ring oscillator chain. Visibly, the multi-mode ring oscillator can be regarded as shorter individual ring oscillators brought together to form a longer ring oscillator. For the ring oscillator shown in Fig. 5 (b), the 9-stage ring oscillator is 3 separate ring oscillators of length 3-each- a NAND gate and 2 inverter gates. The 4 sets of ring oscillators designed for this research begins with one with 9 stages. The subsequent ring oscillators are 2 times the number of stages of the preceding ring oscillator less three stages. Therefore, the next

ring oscillator is of length (2x9) - 3 = 15. The second ring oscillator is then broken into 3 stages consisting of 4-inverters and a NAND gate to generate one of the three edges. The remaining two ring oscillators are of length 27 and 51 based on the same computation. Because the architecture in Fig. 5. is not easily simulated, Fig. 6 shows the operation of the architecture on a Xilinx's Spartan 6 FPGA board using the ChipScope internal logic analyzer tool to show the output after the sampler array unit.



Figure 5. The Architecture of Intel's Random Number Generator



Figure 6. Proposed TRNG Architecture

3.2. Array-Sampling Unit

To increase the rate at which random bits are generated in the proposed architecture, a simple array-sampling unit is proposed. The arraysampler, shown in Fig. 7, is a simple architecture consisting of three registers (Flip-Flops) and then a simple clock generator. Each sampling unit is controlled by three clocks from the K phase clock signals within the array-sampling unit. A total of 3U registers (Flip-Flops) - where U is the number of sampling-unit in the array - sample the input data from the XOR concatenated signal of the

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Figure 7. Array Sampling Architecture and Timing Diagram

multi-mode ring oscillator at both edges of the Kphase clock generator. Due to the very short period between the clocks of the clock generator – τ_1, τ_2, τ_3 – the probability of the data signal being sampled at the threshold voltage increases and this introduces a meta-stable state which in turn increases the entropy of the TRNG. The presence of this meta-stable condition implies that the number of ring oscillators used in the entropy source stage of the TRNG can be reduced [18].

3.3. Post-Processing Unit

The postprocessing unit implemented for this TRNG architecture is the CubeHash function. To ensure that the bitstreams from the multi-mode ring oscillator have good statistical randomness and a high bit rate, the sampled outputs of the multi-mode ring oscillator can be fed to a cryptographically secured hash function. The CubeHash is a collection of hash functions proposed and designed by Daniel J. Bernstein [19]. This set of hash functions was one of NIST's SHA-3 competition candidates eliminated in the second round but is yet to be broken [20]. A key advantage of this algorithm is its simplicity. This hash algorithm uses a uniform structure for

processing message digests of lengths of up to 512 bits, using tweakable number of rounds and message block sizes. Six parameters namely parameters *i*, *f* h, r, b, and m specify the exact tweak or setup of the CubeHash algorithm. The iparameter specifies the number of rounds of the compression function to be executed to obtain the initialization vector. This parameter spans the range of 1 up to ∞ but it is typically 16 whereas the parameter f denotes the number of rounds to be computed for the final block of message to be processed. This value is typically 32 but ranges from 1 to ∞ . The h determines the width of the message digest in bits and ranges from 8-bits to 512-bits in multiples of 8-bits and is typically 512-bits. The r determines the number of rounds compressions to be performed per message block. The r ranges from 1 to ∞ . Not all, the parameter b determines the number of bytes per block message. Finally, m is the parameter that denotes the length of the message that can be processed and it is a string of bits between 0 to $(2^{128} - 1)$ bits. Generally, the CubeHash notation is written as CubeHashi+r/b+f-h(m) to describe a specific variant of the algorithm.





Figure 8. CubeHash Compression Function

Name Value	150 ns	200 n	ns	250 ns		3,250 n	s	3,300 ns		3,350 ns	3,400 ns	3,450 ns	3,500
🔓 clk 0													
la rst_n 1	St	robe signal to	begin com	putation									
l <mark>∎</mark> start o													
l <mark>a</mark> init o													
▶ ■4 X0 2154769200	0	64 X 80 X	269 141	180	55	394	321 1	24 327	. 779	X			
▶ 📑 X1 1833923839	0	<u>64</u> (269 147	153 329 🛛	68	208	258 2	2 341	. 317	*			
▶ ■ X2 1800271621	0	<u>16 X</u> 80 X	673 141	390 215	396	156	239 1	52 369	. 196	X			
Rin[1023:0] 806f2b306d4f74f	000000C Value	for h/8, r and	b 541	6b6 06a	5cb	eb0f	bfcb/4	s c30	. 2e7	1028h3hf514221h8	R7Rhfeh6hc275Re89	1125ef21d782f6d44	hRac74
▶ 🍓 Rout[1023:0] 453b900ccf251f0	0000000000000000	000	541 6b6	06a 090	eb0f	bfcb	(4a5) (c	30 (2e7	. 102	d6cfc79f1f19d0ae	88ebcff0100c111ae	6a873eb31b9b8062	2 5 a344
chain[1023:0] 453b900ccf251f0	0000000 000	000	541 6b6	06a 090.,	eb0f	bfcb	4a5 C	30 (2e7	. 102	IV for CubeH	ash160 + 16 / 6	4+32-512 ⁶²	2 5 a344c
Ug busy 1													
▶ 📑 state[1023:0] 806£2b306d4£74£	0000000000000000	X000 X000 X	101 541	6b6 06a.	5 cb	eb0f	bfcb	15 X c30.	. <mark>2</mark> 2e7	1028b3bf514221b8	\$28bfeb6bc2758e89	125ef21d782f6d44	b8ac74
▶ 📑 round[7:0] 22	0	X 1 X 2 X	3 4	5 6	154	155	156	57 158	159	×			
IV[1023:0]	0000004000000040	000000100000000000000000000000000000000	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	00000000000	00(Total c	of 10r = (160) rou	nds of	compression fu	nction to obtai	nthe IV 10000	00000
▶ 📑 r[31:0] 160													

Figure 9. Simulation of the Computation of the Initialization Vector

Name	Value	0-us 1-us 2-us 3-us 4-us 5-us 6-us 7-us 8-us 9-us	10 us
🔓 dk	1		nnnnnnnn
1 rst_n	1	Strobe signal to initialize the state	
1 init	0	Bostprocessed random numbers read by the processor 32 bits	at a time
16 load	0	Postprotessed rundom numbers read by the protessor 37-bits	ut u time
odata[31:0]	00000000	Strobe signal to begin loading of bits for postprocessing	000000000
▶ 📑 idata[31:0]	00025388	00025378	
Ug ack	0		
Va ovalid	0		
cnt[4:0]	00	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 04 06 05 06 07 08 09 04 06 0c 0d 0c 0f / Packed 512-bits to be postprocessed by the CubeHash	
🕨 📑 msg[511:0]	79530200785302007b5	00000000000, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	0200855302008
1 start	0		
🔓 busy	0	Postprocessed Hash TRN	
hash[511:0]	cbae435392fd82693f1'	00/5df39869c72009fb108994600f1626e6f37c07360c0d8b53d19cf57b8e74/	22b9257fd003 <mark>3</mark> 82
Rin[1023:0]	cbae435392fd82693f1'	00/5df39869c72009fb108994600f1626e6f37c07360c0d8b53d19cf57b8e/	22b9257fd003a82
Rout[1023:0]	9eef3fc83efa1fc4fd44	00 02be71e8bs8bf7f2f410be58369828c816a94236d6abe1e052e077c6c6 00	df404efaf7 <mark>b</mark> 4cc7
chain[1023:0]	9eef3fc83efa1fc4fd44	0	df404efaf7 <mark>b</mark> 4cc7
state[1023:0]	cbae435392fd82693f1'	00/5df39869c72009fb108994600f1626e6f37c07360c0d8b53d19cf57b8e74	22b9257fd003a82
round[4:0]	00		
count[5:0]	00	00 01/02/03/04/05 06/07 Internal state after 16 rounds of compression function 3(17/18/19/18/18/18/16/14/14/14/	00
odata_r[31:0]	00000000		00000000
🕨 📑 msg0[63:0]	7953020078530200	000000000000000 X 79530200 79530200	
🕨 📲 msg1[63:0]	7b5302007a530200	000000000000000 X795 X 705 X 705 X	
🕨 📲 msg2[63:0]	7d5302007c530200	0000000000000 X795 X 765 X 7d530200 7c530200	
🕨 📷 msg3[63:0]	7£5302007e530200	0000000000000 X795 X765 X7765 X77765 X7777777777777777777777777777777777	
🕨 🖏 msg4[63:0]	8153020080530200	0000000000000 X795 X765 X745	
🕨 📷 msg5[63:0]	8353020082530200	0000000000000 X795X705X745X155X1	
🕨 📷 msg6[63:0]	8553020084530200	0000000000000 X795 X7b5 X7b5 X7t5 X815 X815 X	
🕨 📷 msg7[63:0]	8753020086530200	random bits are shifted into the CubeHash 32-bits at a time	

Figure 10. Simulation of the Computation of a Hash of a Message



The variant of CubeHash implemented in this research is the CubeHash160+16/64+32-512.To initialize the internal state of the CubeHash, 10r rounds are performed. Afterward, the first block of data to be hashed, b-byte in size, is XORed into the first b-bytes of the internal state. In the end, rround(s) of the compression function is performed to obtain the message hash. The width of the internal state is 1024-bits and this forms the core of the algorithm's implementation. The round compression function, shown in Fig. 8, operates on the 1024-bit internal state organized as 32 long words, each being 32-bits wide. The State is divided into two halves, each of size 512 bits and labeled as X and Y. This division is performed because the compression function only performs 10 simple operations on half of the internal state which is (512-bits) during each of the 10 compression rounds. At the end of each compression round the outputs X' and Y' are obtained from their respective X and Y halves. The X' and Y' outputs are fed back to X and Y if multiple rounds of the compression are required. The compression function consists of 2 addition modulo 2³², 2 XOR operations, 2 rotation operations and 4 swapping operations as shown in Fig. 8. The precomputed initialization vector (IV) is 0xd6cfc79f1f19d0ae788ebcff0100c111ae16a87 3eb31b9b80625a344d07f2fe269f7245d7aaa6f126f d54233a7447386c59e65d1c33c6ecb09b82faea211 166f8fc1addc5343afe5ee724b803565179e24f7ff6 04687a9b653e0c307b06405f8623e77acf75b428f1 4c22fe6290a39c63e581e2dfd52b75937eb14d8522 588b3. Fig. 9 is the simulation for the initialization vector and shows the setting or tweaking values used for the first three register x0, x1, x2. For test purposes, a randomly generated message length 512-bit of long; 0x79530200785302007b5302007a5302007d5302 007c5302007f5302007e530200815302008053020 0835302008253020085530200845302008753020 086530200 is passed through the CubeHash, using the initialization vector as the one shown in Fig. 10. The resulting hash that is generated for this

message equals to 0x6982fd925343aecb53178826 54a9173f169decafeab719691fdc1ea399bd28f982 3a00fd57922b126f3cf8fa40fa58f54126955750322 deee9fa2443336b31a0. Fig. 11, on the other hand, shows the internal logic capture of the postprocessing using in operation on the Spartan 6 test board. The logic analyzer shows the postprocessing of the first 512-bit generated by the proposed entropy and sampler array units. The first 512-bits generated is shown in the red rectangle in Fig. 11 in little-endian format.

4. Discussion of Results

The proposed architecture was implemented using Verilog HDL with Xilinx's ISE and Vivado Tools. The Modelsim SE 10.6d and Xilinx's ISIM were also used for the functional and timing simulations of the proposed architecture. The design was again tested on Altera's DE2-115 Cyclone IV board. A total of 1GiB of True random number samples were generated continuously at 50MHz and 25 MHz clock frequencies. A simple architecture comprising of a MicroBlaze microcontroller system fitted with a UART module is used to write the generated samples to the PC for analysis and examination of their statistical properties using the statistical test suite by NIST- NIST's SP 800-22 [21]. Results from this test are tabulated in Table. 1 and shows the pvalue alongside the success rate of the generated samples. The results prove the right operation of the proposed architectures and its suitability for use in other systems that require the use of true random numbers. The hardware overhead for the proposed architecture's implementation on Xilinx's Spartan 6 and Altera's Cyclone IV FPGA devices are recorded in Table 2 and Table 3 respectively. From Equation (2), the maximum throughput of the design is determined to be 1422 Mbps considering that the bits are sampled at 512 bits into the CubeHash core using a total of 18 clock cycles and a minimum of 553 Mbps if the bits are sampled into the CubeHash core 32-bits at a time, which requires a total of 48 clock cycles.



🗿 Waveform - DEV:0 MyDevice0 (XC6SLX45) UNIT:0 MyILA0 (ILA)							
Bus/Signal	х	0	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90	95 100 105 110			
/clocks<0>	1	. 0					
/enable_buf	1	1	Hashed outputs of the input bits				
-/uCubeHash/CubeHash_interface/ov	0	0					
∽ /odata	89714F5D	0000000	Period for 16 rounds of compression function	89714F5D			
∽ /uCubeHash/CubeHash_interface/count	00	OF	00)01)02/03/04/05/06/07/08/04/08/02/02/06/07	00			
∽ /uCubeHash/CubeHash_interface/msg0	82C278BF00008040	82C278BF00008040	00000000000000 X 82C278BF00008040				
∽ /uCubeHash/CubeHash_interface/msg1	78A044E012EB5A22	78A044E012EB5A22	00000000000000 X 78A044E012EB5A22				
∽ /uCubeHash/CubeHash_interface/msg2	F2114C3C003C12EC	F2114C3C003C12EC	0000000000000 Xa X X F2114C3C003C12EC				
∽ /uCubeHash/CubeHash_interface/msg3	98BDAE9480E97E40	98BDAE9480E97E40	0000000000000 X X X X 98BDAE9480E97E40				
∽ /uCubeHash/CubeHash_interface/msg4	2A20C8C41000F289	2A20C8C41000F289	0000000000000)8 /2 /8 /8 /8 X				
∽ /uCubeHash/CubeHash_interface/msg5	82549AEF82D6E8EF	82549AEF82D6E8EF	0000000000				
∽ /uCubeHash/CubeHash_interface/msg6	B05668AB9014AE16	B05668AB9014AE16	000000				
∽ /uCubeHash/CubeHash_interface/msg7	E8B42ECB82DF9CCD	82DF9CCDB05668AB	E8B42ECB82DF9CCD				
∽ /uCubeHash/CubeHash_interface/od	89714F5D	0000000	TRN read 32-bit at a time into shift registers (little endian)	89714F5D			
<pre>o- /uSampler_Array/seq</pre>	6323	6C75)00000000000000000000000000000000000000	000000000000000000000000000000000000000			
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	Outputs of the Sampler Array Units						
Waveform captured Feb	Waveform captured Feb 11, 2020 3:21:02 PM X: 94 🕩 0: 33 🕩 4 (X-0): 61						

Figure 11. Simulation of the Computation of a Hash of a Message

Table 1. Results Comparison Detween Designs							
NIST Tost Daskage	CubeHash @ 50 MHz						
NIST TEST Package	P-Value	Success Rate					
Frequency	0.9005	98/100					
Block Frequency	0.6961	99/100					
Cumulative Sums (Forward)	0.1216	99/100					
Cumulative Sums (Reverse)	0.2083	98/100					
Runs	0.0688	98/100					
Longest Run	0.1507	98/100					
Rank	0.6937	98/100					
FFT	0.2070	98/100					
Overlapping	0.6038	99/100					
Universal	0.0248	99/100					
Approximate Entropy	0.9992	99/100					
Serial (m = 16, n= 1024)	0.7599	99/100					
Linear Complexity	0.9022	98/100					

Tabla	1.	Reculte	Comparison	Rotwoon	Decigne
rable	1:	Results	Comparison	Detween	Designs

Tuble 2. Huruware Results from 11 off Implementation (Spartan o)
--

Architecture	Slice	Registers	Slice LUTs Fully utilized LUT-FF		Max Operating		
Architecture	# Used	% Utilization	#Used	% Utilization	#Used	%Utilization	Freq (MHz).
Multi-Mode RO	107	0	233	0	0	0	-
Multi Array Sampler	10	0	15	0	10	66	812
CubeHash	1035	1	2325	10	1050	33	155
TRNG	1714	3	3287	17	1138	29	120

Tabla 2. Handman	o Doculto from	FDC A In	nnlomontation	(Cyclone I	T7)
rable 5: naruwar	e Results from	ггдаш	пристептацоп		. V J
			F F F F F F F F F F	< -	

Architecture	Total Logic Elements	Combinational Functions	Dedicated Logic Registers
Multi-Mode RO	6	6	0
Multi-Array Sampler	15	15	15
CubeHash	3960	3444	1591
TRNG	3029	2994	1156

Throughput= (Operating frequency. x Number of Bits) / Number of Clock Cycle (2)



5. Recommendations

Compared to other light-weight TRNG, the proposed TRNG has a high throughput. This is as a result of the postprocessing unit; CubeHash. The disadvantage of the CubeHash is the area of hardware it occupies. This is, therefore, a tradeoff between throughput and size (hardware area). Several options for the post-processing unit are available. Some of the recommended options for use in place of the CubeHash to reduce the area overhead while decreasing the throughput are the shrink-generator or the linear feedback shift register (LFSR) which are both cryptographic post-processing methods and the Parity filter or the debiasing Von Neumann algorithm [22] which are typical algorithmic post-processing methods

6. Conclusion and Future Work

In the paper, digital standard cells -based TRNG architecture that is able to accumulate jitters to use as a source of randomness has been proposed. This proposed architecture is completely digital as it employs the ring oscillator to exploit the embedded entropy to generate random numbers. The design uses a simple yet effective digital sampler to sample the bits that are generated from the ring oscillator arrays that were implemented. The final sample bits are then fed to the postprocessing unit of choice. For this architecture, the CubeHash cryptographic hash function was used to improve upon the raw sampled bits generated for the statistical tests. The design was implemented on the Spartan-6 FPGA device by Xilinx and also on the Cyclone IV DE2-115 Altera board with a maximum throughput of 1422 Mbps. The statistical test suit from NIST shows that the design architecture passes all the tests and of high quality. With the growing adoption of IoT systems in this era, it has become imperative that the security-related aspects of these systems be met by designers. There is an inherent challenge of obtaining a suitable solution to integrate these TRNG into low-end area constrained devices such as edge and sensor nodes. For future work, we will seek to explore various post-processing algorithms or architectures that will drastically reduce the hardware overhead while keeping the required throughput. Not all, the proposed architecture will be included in the design of an ECIES architecture being developed [23] to generate True Random Numbers (TRNG) for the generation of shared keys.

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